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ABSTRACT
Recent research provides evidence of important changes in the U.S. economic environment over the
last 40 years. This appears to be associated with an alteration of the monetary transmission
mechanism. In this paper we investigate the implications for the evolution of monetary policy
effectiveness. Using an identified VAR over the pre- and post-1980 periods we first provide
evidence of a reduction in the effect of monetary policy shocks in the latter period. We then present
and estimate a fully specified model that replicates well the dynamic response of output, inflation,
and the federal funds rate to monetary policy shocks in both periods. Using the estimated structural
model, we perform counterfactual experiments to determine the source of the observed change in
the monetary transmission mechanism, as well as in the economy's response to supply and demand
shocks. The main finding is that monetary policy has been more stabilizing in the recent past, as a
result of both the way it has responded to shocks, but also by ruling out non-fundamental
fluctuations.
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A growing body of evidence, both anecdotal and from formal statistical investigations, sug-
gests that the behavior of the economy has changed in substantial and fundamental ways
over the last decades. The important decline in the volatility of U.S. real activity and in-
ﬂation since the early 1980’s is a striking illustration.1 This evolving economic environment
appears to be associated with an alteration of the propagation mechanism of monetary pol-
icy. While some authors, such as Stock and Watson (2003), attribute an important part of
the reduced volatility to smaller macroeconomic shocks, there is also evidence of a change
in the impact of monetary policy on output and inﬂation. In particular, studies using vec-
tor autoregressions (VAR) ﬁnd that the impact of monetary policy “shocks”–deﬁned as
unexpected exogenous changes in the Federal funds rate – have had a much smaller impact
on output and inﬂation since the beginning of the 1980’s.2 This is illustrated by circled lines
in Figure 1, which show the response of a measure of detrended output and inﬂation to a
monetary shock of the same size, obtained from a VAR estimated separately for the 1959:1
- 1979:2 and 1979:3 - 2002:2 periods.3
This evidence raises the possibility that the eﬀect of monetary policy on the economy
has changed in important ways. One possible interpretation is that monetary policy has lost
some of its inﬂuence on the economy. Indeed, various innovations in ﬁrms and consumers
behavior, perhaps induced by technological progress or ﬁnancial innovations, might have
allowed consumers to better cushion themselves from the impact of interest rate ﬂuctuations.4
1See, e.g., McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2002),
Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004), Stock and Watson (2002, 2003), Ramey and Vine (2003).
2See the NBER working paper version (no. 5145, June 1995) of Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Gertler
and Lown (2000), Barth and Ramey (2001) and Boivin and Giannoni (2002) among others. In addition,
a special issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Economic Policy Review (2002) focuses on the
monetary transmission mechanism. One of its broad conclusions is that the eﬀects of monetary policy appear
somewhat weaker recently than in previous decades (see e.g., Kuttner and Mosser, 2002).
3The exact deﬁnitions of these variables and how the responses were computed is described in Section 2
below.
4McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) argue that progress
in inventory management could explain the lower volatility of GDP after 1984.
1This is however not the only possible interpretation. In fact, the response to monetary
policy shocks does not only depend on the behavior of households and ﬁrms – in short,
the private sector – b u ta l s oo nt h ew a ym o n e t a r yp o l i c yi sc o n d u c t e d . A sas t r i k i n g
example, if monetary policy were very eﬀective at inﬂuencing output and inﬂation, and the
central bank were able to perfectly oﬀset the eﬀects of exogenous disturbances on these
variables, then estimated impulse responses functions to a monetary policy shock should
display no response of inﬂation and output. Thus an alternative interpretation of the change
in impulse responses reported in Figure 1 is that monetary policy has more successfully
managed to moderate the eﬀects of exogenous disturbances after the early 1980’s, possibly
by systematically responding more decisively to ﬂuctuations in economic conditions.5 In
this case, the change in the responses to monetary shocks would not reﬂect a reduction in
monetary policy eﬀectiveness, but rather an improvement in its conduct.
The eﬀectiveness of monetary policy might have changed along other dimensions as well.
Not only might monetary policy stabilize more eﬀectively the economy in response to its
own shock, but also to other shocks such as real demand and supply disturbances. Another
possibility, as suggested by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), is that monetary policy is now
more successful at ruling out undesired non-fundamental ﬂuctuations. Furthermore, the size
of the policy shocks itself — which could represent random policy mistakes — might have
changed over time.
The goal of this paper is to understand the sources of the changes in the monetary
transmission mechanism and their implications for the various dimensions of monetary policy
eﬀectiveness. We do so by following a two-step strategy. First, using a VAR estimated over
the 1959:1-1979:2 and 1979:3-2002:2 periods, we identify a reduced form policy reaction
function and the implied policy shocks. This allows us to identify, with a minimum amount
of structure, the monetary transmission mechanism, and to characterize its evolution over
5See Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005), and Boivin (2005), among others,
for evidence that U.S. monetary policy has responded more to inﬂation after the early 1980s.
2the past four decades. However, this VAR evidence alone does not allow us to properly
interpret the source of changes, as the private sector behavior and expectations are not
identiﬁed separately from the monetary policy behavior. This motivates the second step of
our strategy, which is to use a structural macroeconomic model to interpret the changes in
the VAR impulse response functions. We specify a micro-founded general-equilibrium model
in the spirit of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005),
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2004), that contains a minimum amount of frictions to account
for the observed persistence of output and inﬂation in U.S. data.
Since one of our objectives is to interpret the evolution of the impulse response functions,
we estimate the model by minimizing the distance between the theoretical and empirical
(i.e., VAR-based) impulse response functions. Although akin to a calibration exercise, this
is a well-deﬁned estimation problem, so that statistical inference can be performed on the
structural parameters. Using the estimated structural model, we can then perform a series of
counterfactual experiments to determine the causes of the observed changes in the monetary
transmission mechanism, and the implications for monetary eﬀectiveness. In particular, we
can determine how the response to the diﬀerent shocks of the model has changed, and to
what extent these changes are due to monetary policy.
The main ﬁnding of this paper is that monetary policy has been overall more stabilizing
since the early 1980’s. In particular, we ﬁnd that the reduced eﬀect of monetary policy
shocks in the post-1980 period can be almost entirely explained by a increase of the Fed
responsiveness to inﬂation expectations. We ﬁnd that the current conduct of monetary policy
also stabilizes inﬂation more eﬀectively in response to supply and demand shocks, and that it
stabilizes output more in the face of demand shocks. When confronted with supply shocks,
though, we ﬁnd that the post-1980 policy exacerbates output ﬂuctuations so as to bring
output closer to its natural rate. Finally, as Clarida et al. (2000) have suggested, we ﬁnd
that the current policy prevents the existence of non-fundamental — sunspot — ﬂuctuations,
3which was not the case in the pre-1980 period.
The estimated structural model allows us also to make counterfactual exercises in order
to determine the sources of the reduction in output and inﬂation volatility in the post-1980
sample. While we ﬁnd, as in Stock and Watson (2003), that the change in shocks have
contributed to the change in output and inﬂation volatility, we ﬁnd in contrast to them
that the change in the estimated systematic behavior of the Federal Reserve has played an
important role in the reduction of output and inﬂation volatility in the U.S.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our VAR model of
the monetary transmission mechanism, provides statistical evidence of structural change in
its parameters and documents the implied reduction in the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks
since the early 1980’s. Section 3 constructs and estimates a fully-speciﬁed general equilibrium
model of the U.S. economy. Section 4 uses this model to interpret the nature of the changes
in the monetary transmission mechanism through various counterfactual analyses. Section
5c o n c l u d e s .
2 Investigating changes in the monetary transmission
mechanism
2.1 Empirical model
The ﬁrst step of our investigation consists of uncovering the monetary policy transmission
mechanism. A structural VAR provides a way to do this by imposing just enough restrictions
to identify an exogenous policy shocks, without having to specify a complete model of the
economy. Our baseline empirical model of the economy is a VAR in variables describing the

















Three variables are included in the non-policy block Zt: detrended output (ˆ Yt)a n dt h e
inﬂation rate (πt), as suggested by the theoretical model developed in Section 3, as well as a
commodity price measure.6 The commodity price inﬂation, although not formally justiﬁed
by the theoretical model, is added to limit the extent of a “price-puzzle” in this VAR.7 The
policy instrument, Rt,i sa s s u m e dt ob et h eF e d e r a lf u n d sr a t e .W h i l et h eF e d ’so p e r a t i n g
procedure has varied in the last four decades, many authors have argued that the Federal
funds rate has been the key policy instrument in the U.S. over most of that period (see e.g.,
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998)).8
In order to identify the policy reaction function and the policy shocks from this VAR,
we assume that the economy (Zt) responds only with a lag to changes in the Fed funds
rate. Although debatable, this identifying assumption is consistent with many recent VAR
6All series are taken from the Standard and Poor’s —DRI database. Detrended output is measured as
the deviation of the natural logarithm of quarterly real GDP (mnemonic GDPQ) from a linear deterministic
trend. The results are robust to the use of alternative detrending methods, including a quadratic trend
and a band pass ﬁlter (see our NY Fed Staﬀ Report # 144). The inﬂation rate is the annualized rate of
change in the GDP deﬂator (mnemonic GDPD) between two consecutive quarters. The commodity price
measure is the quarterly average of the monthly spot market commodity price index (mnemonic PSCCOM).
The original data set runs from 1959:1 to 2002:2. Four lags are included in the VAR, as determined by the
Schwarz information criterion.
7This practice is fairly standard in this literature since Sims (1992). An alternative proposed by Bernanke,
Boivin and Eliasz (2005) is to incorporate more information using a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR). As
shown in the Appendix A, our VAR results are robust to this alternative.
8The Federal funds rate provides probably a less adequate measure of monetary policy stance for the
period running from 1979 to 1982, as non-borrowed reserves were set to achieve a level of interest rates
consistent with money growth targets, but Cook (1989) argues that the Fed funds rate may still provide a
satisfactory indicator during this episode.
5analyses.9 Under this recursive structure, the identiﬁed VAR can be expressed as:
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Equation (2) constitutes an unrestricted speciﬁcation of the policy reaction function, which
can be estimated directly by OLS. As we discuss below, the policy reaction function so
identiﬁed can be seen as a reduced-form expression for the structural policy rule used in the
estimation of the structural model.
Results from VAR models are known to be quite sensitive to their speciﬁcation. Our
simple but standard speciﬁcation has the virtue of containing the minimum set of vari-
ables necessary for our investigation, and yet delivering sensible impulse response functions,
broadly consistent with existing results in the literature. Importantly, the key empirical fea-
ture that we are trying to explain, namely the reduced eﬀect of monetary shocks on output
and inﬂation, is corroborated by diﬀerent speciﬁcations and identifying assumptions. For
instance, Bernanke and Mihov (1998) report a similar reduction in the eﬀect of a policy
shock using a much more sophisticated model of the Fed’s operating procedure.10 Barth
and Ramey (2001) reach similar conclusions using instead long-run restrictions. Further-
more, the robustness analysis discussed in the Appendix A shows that the inclusion of more
information in our VAR does not aﬀect this conclusion.
9See for instance Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Bernanke and Mihov
(1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999).
10See NBER working paper version (no. 5145, June 1995) of Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
62.2 Documenting changes in the eﬀect of monetary policy
2.2.1 Stability tests on the reduced form VAR
The stability of macroeconomic relationships has been investigated in a number of recent
papers. The most general evidence is provided by Stock and Watson (1996) who ﬁnd wide-
spread instability in the bivariate relationships among 76 macroeconomic variables. In the
VAR context, mixed results have been obtained.11 Boivin (1999) argues that the diﬀerences
are due mainly to the small sample properties of the stability tests, and to the eﬀect of
the number of parameters tested on the power of these tests. He concludes that there is
compelling evidence of instability in monetary VARs.
To investigate the stability of the parameters in the VAR described above, we use an het-
eroskedasticity robust version of the Bai, Lumsdaine and Stock (1998) multivariate stability
test. Under the alternative of this test, the VAR parameters are experiencing a discrete shift
at some unknown date. The test allows to test jointly for instability of all the parameters
of the VAR and if instability is detected, conﬁdence intervals for the break date can be
constructed.12 Moreover, this class of tests is also known to have power against other alter-
natives, such as one in which the coeﬃcients follow a random walk (see Stock and Watson,
1998).
The p-value of the test applied to our VAR for the null hypothesis of no change is 0.01,
suggesting that its parameters and the implied propagation mechanism have changed at some
point in the last four decades. The economic signiﬁcance of this change is further emphasized
by Boivin and Giannoni (2002) who show, using a similar VAR, that the observed reduction
in the volatility of inﬂation and output is explained roughly equally by a reduction in the
variance of the shocks and a smaller propagation.13
11Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) and Stock and Watson (2002) ﬁnd evidence of instability in a
monetary VAR, while Bernanke and Mihov (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) conclude
the opposite.
12The implementation of the test follows Stock and Watson (2002).
13Boivin and Giannoni (2002) report stability tests applied only to subsets of these parameters and also
7If we impose on the VAR the structure of the policy rule used in the structural model of
Section 3 and apply the test to this equation only, the p-value is 0.00. We can thus already
conclude that part of the instability observed in the reduced form VAR arises from changes
in the conduct of monetary policy per se.
The 90% conﬁdence interval for the VAR parameters break date ranges from the fourth
quarter of 1977 to the second quarter of 1986. The break dates is thus quite imprecisely
estimated. However, this conﬁdence interval is consistent with a structural change in the
economy occurring in the early 1980’s, as many of the studies mentioned in the introduction
have suggested.14
2.2.2 Split-sample estimates of the impulse response functions
Given this evidence of changes in the economy, we now turn to the implications for the eﬀect
of monetary policy. We assess the changes in the eﬀects of monetary policy by comparing
impulse response functions of the output gap, inﬂation, and the Fed funds rate to a monetary
policy shock, using the VAR estimated over two diﬀerent sub-samples. Based on compelling
anecdotal evidence regarding the conduct of monetary policy, and on previous empirical
studies, while making sure that the samples are not too small, we decided to base our
comparison on the following sub-samples: Sample 1 corresponds to the 1959:1-1979:2 period
and Sample 2 corresponds to the 1979:3-2002:2 period. When estimating the VAR, only
observations from the relevant sub-sample are used, even for the initial lags. The two samples
suggest the presence of instability. Note also that allowing for a break in the constant at the estimated break
date does not change the conclusions reached here.
14Note that the stability test we have implemented allows for a single discrete break in the variance of
the residuals as well as heteroskedasticty that is explained by the lagged dependent variables in the VAR.
However, Sims and Zha (2005) argue that a proper account of heteroskedasticity needs to allow for at least
two discrete changes in the variance of the residuals, one in the late 1970’s and one in the early 1980’s.
There are numerous diﬀerences between our empirical setup and theirs. But one way to check whether
the evidence of parameter instability we found is driven by a failure to account for this second shift in the
variance, is to determine if there is further evidence of parameter instability on the two sub-samples deﬁned
by the identiﬁed break date (1982:1). We ﬁnd no evidence of parameter instability post-1982:1, but the null
of stability is rejected at the 1% level in the pre-1982:1 sample. Moreover, the reduction in the eﬀect of
policy that we document below is robust to the exclusion of the 1979:3—1983:4 period from the comparison,
once the relevant information is properly accounted (see Appendix A).
8are deﬁned by the quarter in which Fed chairman Paul Volcker started his tenure, which
corresponds to the ﬁrst observation of Sample 2. This date is within the conﬁdence interval
of the break date estimate and is consistent with the ﬁnding of Boivin (2005) who, estimating
a time-varying-parameter model, ﬁnds that policy coeﬃcients display an important change
around that time. Of course, the changes could be argued to have occurred at other points
within the conﬁdence interval of the break date estimates. An alternative would be to start
the second sample in 1984:1, a date consistent with some estimates of the date of change in
the volatility of the U.S. economy.15 However, as we argue in Appendix A, with a proper
account of the relevant information, the diﬀerences between the pre- and post-break samples
we emphasize are robust to this alternative choice of the break date.
Figure 1 displays – for both samples – the impulse response functions to an unexpected
unit increase in the Fed funds rate, and the associated 95-percent conﬁdence interval from the
unrestricted VAR.16 The key result from this comparison is that the response of detrended
output and inﬂation is much less pronounced and persistent since the beginning of the 1980’s
than in the previous period; the trough of the response of output is about four times larger
in Sample 1 than in Sample 2. This result suggests that the eﬀect of a monetary policy
shock of a given size was stronger before the 1980’s.
Given the imprecision of the estimated impulse response functions, it is diﬃcult to assess
directly from the conﬁdence intervals reported in Figure 1 whether the changes in impulse
response functions are signiﬁcant or not. However, we have provided statistical evidence of
changes in the parameters of the VAR, and we have shown that these changes imply point
estimates of the impulse response functions that are quite diﬀerent. Moreover, the structural
analysis that we perform below establishes that the changes in the impulse response functions
are driven almost entirely by changes in the policy reaction function, no matter whether
the other structural parameters have changed or not. Since the changes in the estimated
15See McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).
16The 95% conﬁdence intervals were obtained using Kilian’s (1998) bootstrap procedure.
9policy reaction function are found to be statistically signiﬁcant, we can thus conclude that
the diﬀerence in the point estimates of the impulse response function in the two samples
are statistically signiﬁcant. We see these results, together with the existing evidence17,a s
providing compelling evidence of changes in the propagation of monetary policy shocks.
Finally, a by-product of this estimation is a measure of the standard deviation of the
monetary policy shocks in the two samples. In the ﬁr s ts a m p l et h es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o ni s
0.48 compared to 0.60 in the second sample. Taking these numbers literally, this would
suggest that monetary policy has not become more successful in reducing random variations
in its instrument, perhaps stemming from policy mistakes.18 However, we know from the
existing literature that these policy shocks are small, and while they are useful to help us
identify the monetary transmission mechanism, they have a marginal contribution in business
cycle ﬂuctuations. As a result, one would not expect the loss, or the potential gain for that
matter, in monetary policy eﬀectiveness to be important along this dimension.
3 Structural analysis of the monetary transmission mech-
anism
The main goal of this investigation is to determine the implications of these changes for
the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. This requires identifying separately the parameters
describing the private sector behavior from those describing the policy behavior. To do so,
we estimate a stylized structural model so that it replicates as well as possible the response
of the economy to monetary policy shocks. In the next section, we use this model to perform
17As noted in the introduction, see Barth and Ramey (2001), Gertler and Lown (2000), Boivin and
Giannoni (2002), and other papers collected in the special issue of Economic Policy Review (2002).
18This result might be surprising at ﬁrst. However, this is clearly due to the inclusion of the early 1980’s
in the second sample, where the Fed funds rate was very volatile. While as argued above, the starting date of
t h es a m p l ed o e sn o ta ﬀect the estimated impulse response functions, it does aﬀect size of the policy shocks.
For instance, if we start the second sample in 1984:1 instead, the standard deviation of the policy shocks is
0.23.
10counterfactual experiments, to determine the source of the changes in the impulse response
functions and volatilities observed for the two samples.
3.1 A stylized structural model of the U.S. economy
The model that we consider is set up to be consistent with the structure of the VAR consid-
ered in previous sections. It extends the Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) model by adding
two key elements that have become fairly standard by now: habit formation in consump-
tion, and inﬂation inertia. These additional features allow the model to display much more
endogenous persistence and to better replicate the response of real output, inﬂation and the
interest rate to an unexpected monetary policy shock, in particular in the pre-1980 sample.
At the same time, our model simpliﬁes the models of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2004) by leaving aside features of their models that are not necessary to ﬁt
the dynamic response of inﬂation, output and interest rates to monetary policy shocks.
One simpliﬁcation with respect to Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003,
2004) is that we consider all interest-rate sensitive expenditure (including what is commonly
classiﬁed as investment spending) as if it were non-durable consumption. Of course, one may
wonder why we are considering habit persistence in the level of aggregate private expenditure,
and not merely in consumption. The reason is that models that can successfully account
separately for investment and consumption usually assume adjustment costs in the rate of
investment spending (e.g., Edge, 2000; Christiano et al., 2005; Altig et al. 2005; Basu and
Kimball, 2003). As shown in Woodford (2003, ch. 5, sec. 1.2) in a discussion of our model,
this kind of adjustment costs yields a log-linearized Euler equation for investment expenditure
that is identical to the one reported below, so that the degree of “habit persistence” assumed
here can be interpreted as a proxy for adjustment costs in investment expenditure.19As a
19Although our simpliﬁcation aﬀects the interpretation of the coeﬃcient of “habit persistence”,i td o e s
not aﬀect the results of the counterfactual experiments we perform below, as we only change the parameters
describing the private sector as a group.
11result, the fact that we consider all interest-rate sensitive expenditure as if it were non-
durable consumption amounts to abstracting from the eﬀects of private expenditures on
future production capacities, as discussed in McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Woodford
(2003, ch. 4). Since, as shown in Woodford (2003, ch. 5; 2005), a ﬁxed-capital model of the
kind we analyze here and the variant of it that separately accounts for investment may be
calibrated so as to generate almost identical impulse responses of inﬂation, output, interest
rates and real marginal costs to a monetary shock, our simpliﬁcation should not dramatically
aﬀect the model’s predictions for the variables that we seek to explain.
We assume that there is a continuum of households indexed by j, each of which seeks to



















where β ∈ (0,1) is the household’s discount factor, C
j
t is a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregate of
the household’s real expenditure for each of the diﬀerentiated goods at date t, yt(j) is the
amount of the specialized good that household j supplies at date t.T h ev e c t o rξt represents
disturbances to preferences. We allow the parameter ˜ η to lie between 0 and 1, so that the
households’ utility depends on the deviation of current expenditure C
j
t from some internal
habit stock ˜ ηC
j
t−1.20 As we show below, the presence of habit formation allows us to replicate
the hump-shaped response of output to a monetary policy shock.
We assume that ﬁnancial markets are complete, so that risks are eﬃciently shared. As
a result, all households face an identical intertemporal budget constraint, and choose to
consume the same amount at any date. We may therefore drop the superscript j in C
j
t.
Furthermore, we assume, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), that households must
20One speciﬁcation of the utility function u could be for instance u =( Ct − ˜ ηCt−1 + M)
1−ρ /(1 − ρ),
where M ≥ 0 is large enough for the whole term in parenthesis to be positive (for all dates and all states).
Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001) and Christiano et al. (2005) assume a simpliﬁed version of this utility
function of the form u =l o g ( Ct−˜ ηCt−1). In contrast, Amato and Laubach (2004) and Fuhrer (2000) consider
monetary models with “multiplicative” habit formation introduced by Abel (1990) and Galí (1994).
12choose the index Ct at date t − 2,s ot h a tCt+2 = EtCt+2.21 This assumption is consistent
with the identifying restriction imposed in the VAR considered above, according to which
both output and inﬂation are prevented from responding to a contemporaneous monetary
shock. Moreover, an assumption of this kind is needed to account for the fact that monetary
policy shocks in the U.S. start exerting a signiﬁcant eﬀect on GDP after two quarters.22 In
addition, we assume that the government purchases a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate Gt of all goods
in the economy. This implies that the aggregate demand for the composite good, Yt, satisﬁes
Yt = Ct +Gt.23 For consistency with the assumption made in our VAR for the identiﬁcation
of monetary policy shocks, we assume that Gt is determined before the interest rate is set in
period t, so that Gt is determined on the basis of information available at date t − 1.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal choice of consumption together with the goods
market equilibrium condition just mentioned characterize the link between the interest rate
and aggregate demand. We consider log-linear approximations of these equations around a
steady state in which there are no exogenous disturbances and prices are stable. As shown
in Appendix B, they yield a variant of the intertemporal IS equation
ˆ Yt = ηˆ Yt−1 + βηEt−2ˆ Yt+1 − ψEt−2ˆ r
L













σ(1 − β˜ η)






0 ≤ η ≡
˜ η
1+β˜ η2 ≤ (1 + β)
−1 ,
21Another interpretation of this assumption is that households choose the amount of expenditure using
information regarding the state of the economy two periods earlier.
22To the extent that Ct also represents investment spending, the assumption that it is planned two periods
in advance also relates to the time-to-build assumption introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982).
23While Gt is associated here with government expenditures, it can more generally represent variations in
autonomous (i.e., not interest-rate sensitive) spending.
13and ˆ Yt,a n dˆ Rt represent respectively percent deviations of aggregate output Yt, and the
riskless gross nominal interest rate 1+Rt from their steady-state level, πt ≡ log(Pt/Pt−1) is
the inﬂation rate, and gt is an exogenous real demand disturbance that depends on Gt, past
expectations of Gt and the preference disturbance ξt.24 Note that because Gt is determined at
t−1, both gt and ˆ Yt a r ed e t e r m i n e da td a t et−1. The variable ˆ rL
t denotes percent deviations
of the long term real interest rate, which happens to coincide with the marginal utility of
additional income. In the absence of habit-formation, the coeﬃcient σ would represent the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (EIS) of private expenditure evaluated at the steady-
state times the consumption share.25 S i n c ei ti sd i ﬃcult to interpret this parameter in the
presence of habit formation, we prefer to focus on a pseudo-EIS, ψ, which is the elasticity
of expected output growth with respect to changes in the real return, conditional on output
growth remaining constant in other periods.26 As (4) makes clear, real output depends
negatively on the long-term real interest rate and positively on past and expected future
output, due to habit persistence.27
Monetary policy has real eﬀects in this model, because it is assumed that not all suppliers
are able to adjust their prices in response to disturbances. Speciﬁcally, we assume as in
Calvo (1983) that a fraction (1 − α) of suppliers can choose a new price at the end of any
given period, and that the price-setters who are allowed to change their price are chosen
independently of their history of price changes. The timing that we assume implies that
the sellers who get to change their prices at date t must decide on the basis of information
24We view the variables used in the VAR — detrended output, the inﬂation rate, and the Fed funds rate —
as the empirical counterparts of ˆ Yt, πt and ˆ Rt.
25As mentioned above this coeﬃcient may also serve as a proxy for adjustment costs in investment expen-
diture.
26This can be seen by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences of equation (4), and combining with (5).
27Note that in the absence of habit formation, (4) reduces to ˆ Yt = −σEt−2ˆ rL
t + gt, so that after taking
ﬁrst diﬀerences and using (5) we obtain the familiar output Euler equation
ˆ Yt = Et ˆ Yt+1 − σEt−2
³
ˆ Rt − πt+1
´
+( gt − Etgt+1),
where output depends negatively on the short-term real interest rate.
14a v a i l a b l ea td a t et−1, which is again consistent with the assumption made in the structural
VAR to identify monetary policy shocks. Following Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2004), we assume that if a price is not re-optimized, it is indexed to lagged
inﬂation according to the rule
logpt (z)=l o gpt−1 (z)+γπt−1,
for some 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. As shown in Appendix B, a log-linearization of the optimal pricing
condition and of the law of motion for the aggregate price level yields the following variant
of the new-Keynesian aggregate supply equation
πt − γπt−1 = ξEt−1ˆ st + βEt−1 (πt+1 − γπt), (6)
where
ˆ st ≡ ωˆ Yt − ˆ r
L
t − qt (7)
represents percent deviations from steady-state of the average (across ﬁrms) real marginal
cost, ω>0 is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of producing output with respect to
an increase in output, and ξ ≡
(1−α)(1−αβ)
(1+ωθ)α > 0 is a parameter that depends on the degree
of price stickiness, α, the elasticity of demand, θ, and ω. The exogenous variable qt is a
positive supply shock that measures reductions in the disutility of producing output.28 It
can be shown that ˆ st relates to a measure of the output gap, ˆ Yt − ˆ Y n
t , deﬁned as the percent
deviation of output from its natural rate whereby the natural rate we mean the equilibrium
output that would obtain in the absence of price rigidities (see Appendix B).
As in the standard New Keynesian supply equation, inﬂation depends positively on the
28Instead of assuming that the household derives disutility from supplying its specialized good, we could
assume that it derives disutility from supplying labor, and that the goods are produced using labor and
some ﬁx e da m o u n to fc a p i t a l .I ns u c hac a s e ,qt would also include ﬂuctuations in total factor productivity
as well as in the disutility of labor supply.
15expectation of the gap between output and its natural rate, as well as on the expectation
of future inﬂation. Here it is the expectation formed at date t − 1 that is relevant for the
determination of period-t inﬂation, as sellers are assumed to set their prices on the basis of
information available at date t−1. In addition, inﬂation depends on past inﬂation. While the
aggregate supply equation (6) is very stylized, it nests as special cases some popular models
that have very diﬀerent implications, in particular regarding the degree of persistence in
inﬂation. Except for the fact that pricing decisions at date t are taken here on the basis
information available at date t−1, (6) reduces to the basic New Keynesian aggregate supply
equation with Calvo pricing when γ =0and η =0 . Alternatively, when γ =1 ,η=0 , and
β =1 , (6) is similar to the aggregate supply equation of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). We
assume that prices which are not re-optimized are adjusted to lagged inﬂation, but we could
have derived an equation almost identical to (6) – with diﬀerent restrictions on the model
parameters – by assuming instead that some sellers are not rational and that they set their
prices according to a simple rule of thumb, as in Galí and Gertler (1999).
Finally, the model is closed by a description of the central bank behavior. To the extent
that the central bank is forward-looking, the coeﬃcients of the VAR policy equation will sub-
sume policy parameters – i.e., the parameters characterizing the Fed’s systematic behavior
– as well as the remaining parameters needed to form the expectations, conditional on the
time-t information set. To distinguish between changes in the private sector and policy be-
havior we need to specify a structural form of the reaction function. The forward-looking
Taylor rule is one such policy reaction that is consistent with the reduced form policy of the
VAR. It takes the form
ˆ Rt = φπEtπt+hπ + φyEtˆ Yt+hy + ρ1 ˆ Rt−1 + ρ2 ˆ Rt−2 + εt, (8)
where εt is an unforecastable random variable that represents monetary policy shocks. For
the horizons hπ =0and hy =0 , equation (8) corresponds to the popular rule proposed
16by Taylor (1993), augmented by lags of the Fed funds rate.29 As another special case, the
baseline case considered by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) obtains when hπ =1and hy =
1.30 31 As in Taylor (1993), we assume that the Federal Reserve has responded to ﬂuctuations
of output around a deterministic trend over the sample considered.32 Alternatively, we could
assume that the Fed has responded to the welfare-relevant output gap, ˆ Yt− ˆ Y n
t . Even though
the model suggests that optimal policy should respond to such an output gap,33 we view it
as more realistic to characterize historical policy in terms of detrended output which displays
expansion and recession periods in line with conventional accounts, such as those from the
NBER. As Woodford (2001) points out, the welfare-relevant output gap derived from models
like ours diﬀers considerably from detrended output, and might even be negatively correlated
with it. A policy that responds to such an output gap could thus in principle result in
outcomes that might be very diﬀerent from those observed. However, given the small values
of the coeﬃcients φy that we estimate below, the measure of activity considered in the policy
r u l ep l a y sv e r yl i t t l er o l ef o ro u rr e s u l t s . 34
The model that we use for the joint determination of the evolution of inﬂation, real
output and the short-run and long-run interest rates (all expressed in terms of deviations
from their steady state), can be summarized by the “IS block” (4) — (5) , the aggregate
supply equation (6) — (7), and the interest-rate feedback rule (8). The resulting system
29The Fed funds rate is known to display a lot of persistence. This phenomenon might arise from a Fed’s
interest-rate smoothing concern or could reﬂect optimal policy under commitment (cf. Woodford, 1999).
The speciﬁcation that we consider involves two lags of the interest rate. This turns out to be the most
parsimonious speciﬁcation that is not rejected by the test of overidentifying restrictions.
30These authors estimate such a rule by GMM, in the single equation framework, assuming rational
expectations on the part of the central bank. In contrast, we estimate this equation together with the rest
of our structural model as described in the next sub-section.
31Giannoni and Woodford (2003) characterize optimal interest-rate rules for models similar to the one
presented here (but slightly simpler). They argue that while it is desirable to set the interest rate as a
function of forecasts of inﬂation and output gap, there is little ground for letting interest-rate decisions
respond to forecasts longer than a few quarters in the future.
32As mentioned in footnote 6, we removed a linear trend from log output, but our results are robust to
alternative detrending methods.
33See Giannoni and Woodford (2004) for a characterization of optimal monetary policy in a similar model.
34As will become clear in the next section, our estimation method has the property that the estimate of
φy is the same whether we consider detrended output or the output gap in (8).
17of linear diﬀerence equations can then be solved using standard methods (e.g., King and
Watson, 1998; McCallum, 1998).
For some parameter conﬁgurations, the model may result in an indeterminate equilib-
rium.35 This may arise when the policy reaction function involves too little a response to
changes in economic conditions, as Clarida et al. (2000) argue might have been the case
f o rt h ep r e - V o l c k e rp e r i o d . 36 This is in fact one dimension along which monetary policy
c o u l dh a v eb e c o m em o r ee ﬀective and that we wish to investigate. But allowing parameters
conﬁguration to lie in the indeterminate region raises some diﬃculty: whenever this is the
case, one equilibrium must be selected and there is unfortunately no natural criterion to
select a particular one. So in the case of indeterminacy, the particular equilibrium that we
select is the minimum-state-variable solution advocated by McCallum (1983), i.e., the single
bubble-free solution. This solution corresponds to a situation where the economy could be
subject to sunspots ﬂuctuations, but there happens to be no such shock. While we recognize
that the criterion that we adopt to select a solution may not be the only one, we ﬁnd it
appealing, in particular when compared to the alternative of ruling out ap r i o r ithe pos-
sibility of indeterminacy. For instance, it allows us to implement the estimation strategy
described in the next section, even when parameter conﬁgurations yield an indeterminate
equilibrium.37
35This means that for any bounded solution {zt}, where zt is the vector of variables of interest
h
ˆ Yt,πt, ˆ Rt
i0
,
there exists another bounded solution of the form
z0
t = zt + v t,
where v is an appropriately chosen (nonzero) vector, and the stochastic process { t} may involve arbitrarily
large ﬂuctuations, that may or may not be correlated with the fundamental disturbances {εt,g t,q t}.I t
follows that for such a parameter conﬁguration, the model may involve arbitrarily large ﬂuctuations of real
output, inﬂation and the interest rate, independently of the size of the fundamental shocks.
36See, e.g., Woodford (2003, ch. 2 and 4) for a discussion of the problem of indeterminacy of the equilibrium
in monetary models of the kind analyzed here.
37Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) propose an alternative approach that allows for the possibility of multiple
equilibria in the estimation of DSGE models. However, unlike the estimation strategy discussed below, their
Bayesian approach requires a complete speciﬁcation of the shock processes and of all prior distributions.
183.2 Estimation of the structural model
3.2.1 Minimum distance estimation of the structural parameters
We now turn to the estimation of the structural model just described.38 In section 2, we esti-
mated a structural VAR, that allowed us to generate impulse response functions to monetary
policy innovations. The model described in the previous subsection is consistent with the
identifying assumption imposed in the VAR, and delivers impulse responses of the variables
of interest for a given set of structural parameters. Our econometric methodology involves
selecting the structural parameters that minimize the distance between the estimated VAR
responses and the model-based responses. In a way, this can be seen as a calibration exercise.
As we now discuss, however, it is a well-deﬁned econometric exercise that can be seen as an
application of “semi-parametric indirect inference” (Dridi, Guay and Renault, 2005).39
More formally, we consider the vector of structural parameters for Sample s, ∆s,t h e
vector Ωs containing the identiﬁed VAR coeﬃcients and GV (Ωs), the vector-valued function
that collects the VAR-based impulse response functions of output, inﬂation and the interest
rate to a monetary policy innovation. In addition, we denote by GM (∆s) the corresponding
vector-valued function that collects the model-based impulse response functions yielded by
its rational expectations solution. Let G(Ωs,∆s) ≡ GM (∆s) − GV (Ωs). Having estimated










with respect to ∆s to obtain the minimum distance estimator ˆ ∆s, where Ws is a positive
deﬁnite weighting matrix which we discuss below.
38A similar estimation procedure can be found in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Amato and Laubach
(2003), Gilchrist and Williams (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005).
39Our estimation method is also similar in spirit to the speciﬁcation test used by Cogley and Nason
(1995), although it was based on matching autocorrelation functions and they were not concerned with the
estimation of the structural parameters.
19We ﬁnd this estimation strategy appealing for several reasons. First, since we are in-
terested in explaining the observed changes in the impulse response function to a monetary
shock in the two samples considered, it is natural to estimate the structural parameters
directly on the basis of the impulse responses functions. Certainly, more eﬃcient estimates
of the structural parameters could be obtained by exploiting the response of the economy
to other shocks. But this potential eﬃciency gain has to be weighted against the cost of
additional identifying assumptions that would be required. Moreover, to the extent that
the model is unable to explain all the features of the data, the estimation on the basis of
responses to monetary shocks allows us to focus the estimation on the relevant empirical
features of the data that we seek to explain. In this sense, the estimation approach is robust
to the identiﬁcation of other shocks and to the speciﬁcation of parts of the model that are
not related to the impulse response functions we are interested in.40 Speciﬁcally, while the
endogenous variables are aﬀected by demand and supply shocks gt and qt in the theoretical
model, our econometric strategy allows us to estimate the structural parameters of interests
without estimating the parameters that characterize the stochastic processes {gt} and {qt}.
Finally, as Hall (2001) pointed out, estimation through impulse response functions has an
important advantage over the application of GMM to Euler equations: it indirectly imposes
the model’s boundary conditions.41
Our structural model involves a total of ten structural parameters:
©
φπ,φ y,ρ 1,ρ 2,β,ψ,ξ,
ω,η,γ}. All of these parameters could in principle be separately identiﬁed from the impulse
response functions to a monetary policy shock. However, in order to reduce the dimension
of the estimation, we calibrate β to 0.99, b e c a u s ei tc a nb ei d e n t i ﬁed directly from ﬁrst
moments of the data. In fact β
−1 corresponds to the steady-state gross real rate of return,
40The robustness of this estimation approach to a misspeciﬁcation of the theoretical model is discussed
more generally in Dridi and Renault (2001).
41In our model, terminal conditions are automatically satisﬁed once we restrict ourselves to bounded
ﬂuctuations of the endogenous variables around the steady state. The estimation method thus retains
the advantage mentioned by Hall (2001) as it incorporates the assumption that endogenous variables are
bounded.
20which is approximately 1.01 on average. We thus attempt to estimate the remaining nine
parameters ∆ =
©
φπ,φ y,ρ 1,ρ 2,ψ,ξ,ω,η,γ
ª
by matching the model-based impulse response
functions with those of the VAR, subject to the model constraints on the sign and magnitude
of the parameters.42 We consider the responses of the variables over the ﬁrst sixteen quarters
f o l l o w i n gt h em o n e t a r ys h o c k .T h i sc h o i c ei sm o t i v a t e db yt h ef a c tt h a tm o s to ft h ed i ﬀerence
in the output response in two samples occurs within this horizon. Moreover, this corresponds
approximately to the time that it takes for output to return to its initial level, following a
monetary policy shock.
To estimate the structural parameters, we also need to determine an asymptotically non-
stochastic weighting matrix Ws i n d i c a t e di n( 9 ) . T oa c c o u n tf o rt h ef a c tt h a ts o m ep o i n t s
of the impulse response functions are less precisely estimated than others, we use a diagonal
weighting matrix that involves the inverse of each impulse response’sv a r i a n c eo nt h em a i n
diagonal.43
3.2.2 Estimation of the forecasting horizon
The estimation of the policy reaction function requires the speciﬁcation of the horizons hπ
and hy. Such horizons are usually speciﬁed on ap r i o r igrounds, based on what is thought
to be reasonable lags for the eﬀect of monetary policy on the economy. But the horizon
that a central bank should be considering is not clear in theory. While forward-looking rules
are often motivated from the existence of lags in the eﬀect of monetary policy, there is also
a case to be made for backward-looking rules, which might provide more stability. Given
42In turns out however that the parameter ω is not well identiﬁed as the objective function appears to
be very ﬂat with respect to ω. We thus decided to calibrate ω to 0.47, the value found in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997).
43The intuition for eﬃcient GMM estimation would suggest to use the complete variance-covariance matrix
of impulse response functions as a weighting matrix. It should be noted however that this seems infeasible
in the present context. In fact, the impulse response functions are non-linear functions of the underlying
structural parameters. Consequently, if the number of impulse response points we are trying to match is
larger than the number of structural parameters – as it would be the case if our structural model were the
true one – the joint distribution of the impulse response points we use in the estimation would be singular.
Hence, the variance-covariance matrix would be ill-behaved and the usual asymptotic theory for the J-test
would not apply.
21the absence of a clear criterion to select the horizon a priori and, importantly, given the
sensitivity of the results to this choice, it appears desirable to infer the horizon from the
data.
As the forward-looking rule (8) is just an over-identiﬁed version of equation (2), one
can select the horizon that minimizes the distance of the over-identiﬁed model from the
unrestricted model. A measure of this distance is provided by the Hansen J-test. We thus
select the horizon minimizing this test statistic. As a by-product, this statistic provides
a measure of the accuracy of the speciﬁcation – other than the horizon – embedded in
equation (8).
Table 1 reports the p-values of the J-test for all combinations of hπ and hy up to 4
quarters, and for the two samples. The best horizon, i.e., the one with the highest p−value,
is hπ =3and hy =0 , for the 1959:1-1979:2 period and hπ =2 , hy =0 , respectively for
the 1979:3-2002:2 period. For these horizons, the forward-looking Taylor rule speciﬁcation
is not rejected at the 5% level. Noting that a 95% conﬁdence interval for these horizons
would include any combination (hπ,h y) with a p-value larger than 5%, the table suggests
that within the set of horizons less than or equal to four, the horizons are fairly precisely
estimated.
3.3 Estimation results
Table 2 reports the structural parameters’ estimates, along with the associated standard
deviations for both samples. Note ﬁrst that the degree of habit formation and inﬂation
inertia are similar in both samples, and remain close to, or on the theoretical upper bounds
imposed in the estimation. The fact that the degree of inﬂation inertia γ is estimated to be
1 implies that our estimated aggregate supply equation is very similar to the one proposed
by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). Looking next at the remaining parameters describing the
behavior of the private sector, the main diﬀerences between the two samples are in terms
22of the sensitivity of output to the long-run interest rate in the IS curve, ψ,a n dt h es l o p e
of the Phillips curve, ξ: from Sample 1 to Sample 2, ψ increases from 0.50 to 0.66 while ξ
falls from 0.011 to 0.008. While we cannot separately identify the parameters θ and α from
the estimated parameter ξ, it is interesting to observe that for an assumed desired markup
of prices over marginal costs of 10% (so that θ/(θ − 1) = 1.1), as is often considered in
the literature, the implied average duration between price reoptimizations, (1 − α)
−1 , is 4.4
quarters in the ﬁrst sample and 5.1 quarters in the second sample. However, given that
prices are automatically indexed to lagged inﬂation every quarter, ﬁrms must not wait for
an implausibly long amount of time between price changes. Our results appear thus broadly
consistent with the survey evidence reported by Blinder (1994), according to which prices
are maintained constant for an average of 3 quarters.
Overall, the estimated parameters of the private sector suggest that detrended output
has become more sensitive to the real rate of return, and that inﬂation responds slightly less
to changes in the real marginal cost, maybe due to a possible increase in price rigidity (i.e.,
an increase in the probability α). This implies, everything else equal, that changes in the
instrument of monetary policy should have had a stronger eﬀect on output after 1980.
It is diﬃcult to provide justiﬁcations for changes in certain “deep” parameters, such as
those of the utility function embedded in ψ. Although we doubt that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution has changed substantially, we view instead these estimates as cap-
turing the fact that the private sector of the economy has reacted more strongly to changes
in interest rates in the post-1980 sample than in the pre-1980 sample. Moreover, rather
than ruling out changes in the private sector parameters ap r i o r i , in the next section we
account for these changes and determine whether or not they aﬀect our conclusions about
the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. We ﬁnd that they do not.
Turning to the policy parameters, the main result is that the response coeﬃcient of the
Federal funds rate to inﬂation is about twice as large in the second sample than in the ﬁrst.
23This is consistent with the evidence obtained by Clarida et al. (2000), Cogley and Sargent
(2001, 2005), Boivin (2005), among others, using very diﬀerent empirical strategies. Even
though the policy coeﬃcient on output (or output gap) ﬂuctuations is typically estimated to
be smaller than the coeﬃcient on inﬂation, our estimated coeﬃcient on output ﬂuctuations
is insigniﬁcant in the context of our forward-looking interest rate rule.
An important implication is that in the ﬁrst sample, the conﬁguration of estimated para-
meters yields an indeterminate rational expectation equilibrium, as in Clarida et al. (2000).
This is not the case in the second sample. There is a strong presumption that this is due
to the weakness of the central bank response in the ﬁrst sample, thus implying that mone-
t a r yp o l i c yb e c a m em o r ee ﬀective along that dimension.44 However, this cannot be asserted
deﬁnitely without taking into account the changes in the other structural parameters. We
investigate this issue in the counterfactual experiments of the next section.
Figure 1 plots both the impulse response functions estimated from the VAR (circles),
along with their 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, and the corresponding impulse response
functions generated by the estimated structural model (solid lines), for both samples. Notice
that the model is able to replicate quite precisely both the magnitude and the persistence of
the impulse responses generated by the VAR, and the model-based impulse responses remain
consistently within the conﬁdence interval.45 For the ﬁrst sample, the model reproduces
reasonably well the hump-shaped response of output, the progressive decline in inﬂation,
and the response of the interest rate. For the second sample, the ﬁt is even better. The
m o d e lc a p t u r e st h er a p i dd e c l i n ef o l l o w e db yar e t u r nt os t e a d ys t a t e ,b o t hi ni n ﬂation and
output, and it tracks the response of the interest rate.
44In fact, by plotting the number of unstable eigenvalues of the dynamic system characterizing our esti-
mated model in the (φπ,φ y) space (not reported here), we observe that the equilibrium would be determinate
for values of φπ above 0.33 and values of φy above 0.04.
45The only exception is the response of inﬂation the ﬁrst two periods after the shock in Sample 1.
244 Explaining the changes in the economy
Having argued that our model replicates reasonably well the eﬀects of monetary shocks on
output, inﬂation and the interest rate in both samples, we proceed with a model-based coun-
terfactual analysis to provide an explanation for the changes in the economy, and investigate
whether monetary policy has become more eﬀective. In these counterfactual experiments,




y,ρ 1,ρ 2}, and the behavior of the private sector by the set of parameters
∆PS
s = {ψ,ξ,ω,η,γ}.
We ﬁrst determine whether it is monetary policy or the behavior of the private sector that
has been instrumental in removing indeterminacies of the rational expectations equilibrium
in the post-1980 period. We then seek to determine to what extent the reduced eﬀect of
monetary policy shocks in the post-80 sample is due to an improvement in monetary policy
or a change in the private sector’s behavior. Next, we assess the relevance of monetary policy
and the private sector in accounting for changes in the response to real demand and supply
disturbances. Finally, we discuss the extent to which the reduction in output and inﬂation
volatility is attributable to changes in monetary policy, private sector behavior, or exogenous
shocks.
4.1 Indeterminacy
In the previous section we documented the presence of an indeterminate equilibrium in
the pre-1979 period. To determine the cause of indeterminacy, Table 3 reports for various
combinations of the estimated private sector (∆PS
s ) and monetary policy parameters (∆MP
s )
whether or not they involve a unique rational expectations equilibrium. This Table reveals
that it is indeed monetary policy that is the source of indeterminacy in the ﬁrst sample,
as in Clarida et al. (2000). In fact, if the monetary policy rule estimated for the pre-1979
period had been maintained in the second sample, an indeterminate equilibrium would have
25resulted. In contrast, the recent conduct of monetary policy would have would have ruled
out non-fundamental ﬂuctuations in the ﬁrst sample. This is thus clearly a dimension along
which monetary policy has become more eﬀective.
4.2 Responses to exogenous disturbances
Figure 2 displays the impulse response functions generated by the model to an innovation
– au n i ti n c r e a s e– in each of the three exogenous disturbances εt,g t, and qt. Each panel
of Figure 2 contains impulse responses for the four possible combinations of monetary policy
(∆MP
s ) and private sector (∆PS
s ) parameters, where s =1for the 1959:1—1979:2 period and
s =2for the 1979:3—2002:2 period. Since the equilibrium is indeterminate in the case of the
monetary policy rule of sample 1, the impulse responses and standard deviations associated
with that monetary policy rule are not uniquely determined. As discussed above, we report
those implied by the single bubble-free equilibrium. Since the latter equilibrium excludes a
priori non-fundamental disturbances, it should result in a lower volatility and smaller impulse
responses than would be the case for most alternative equilibria possible with that policy
rule. Thus by selecting the bubble-free equilibrium, we are depicting a relatively favorable
picture of the policy rule of sample 1.
The responses to the monetary shock (in the ﬁrst column) clearly show that the observed
change in the monetary transmission mechanism is due to a change in the systematic conduct
of monetary policy. A comparison of the two sets of responses (∆MP
1 ,∆PS
1 ) and (∆MP
1 ,∆PS
2 )
– i.e. maintaining monetary policy as estimated in the ﬁrst sample – reveals that, if
anything, the change in the private sector implies a larger response of output, not smaller
one. This is consistent with the fact that we have estimated a larger values of ψ in the
second sample. The inﬂation response is almost unaﬀected by the change in parameters
of the private sector, in particular in sample 2. For all three variables, a comparison of
the impulse responses (∆MP
2 ,∆PS
1 ) and (∆MP
2 ,∆PS
2 ) – i.e. maintaining monetary policy as
26estimated in the second sample – suggests that the change in the structural parameters has
almost no eﬀect on the impulse response functions.
The striking result, however is that the observed reduction in the magnitude of the im-
pulse responses is almost entirely attributable to monetary policy. In fact, by changing
monetary policy and maintaining the structural parameters ﬁxed – i.e., by comparing the
lines (∆MP
1 ,∆PS
1 ) to (∆MP
2 ,∆PS
1 ),a n d(∆MP
1 ,∆PS
2 ) to (∆MP
2 ,∆PS
2 ) – w eo b s e r v et h a tt h e
responses of output and inﬂation associated with the policy estimated for the second sample
involve considerably less variation than those associated with the policy of Sample 1. Main-
taining the structural parameters constant at ∆PS
1 , a change in policy from ∆MP
1 to ∆MP
2
almost entirely explains the impulse responses (∆MP
2 ,∆PS
2 ) obtained in the second period.
This counterfactual experiment thus suggests that the change in the estimated impulse re-
sponses to a monetary shock, ﬁr s tr e p o r t e di nF i g u r e1 ,i sa t t r i b u t a b l ea l m o s te n t i r e l yt oa
change in the systematic conduct of monetary policy. The fact that the response of output
and inﬂation has become considerably smaller in the post-80 period thus does not appear to
reﬂect a diminished eﬀect of monetary policy on these variables. Rather, our analysis sug-
gests that it is the fact that monetary policy has been reacting more strongly to ﬂuctuations
in expected inﬂation that has helped stabilize the economy in response to monetary shocks.
The second column of Figure 2, which plots the counterfactual responses to a real de-
mand disturbance – i.e., an innovations in gt – conveys a similar message.46 While the
responses of output, inﬂation and the interest rate are slightly smaller with the private sector
parameters of Sample 2 – comparing (∆MP
1 ,∆PS
1 ) and (∆MP
1 ,∆PS
2 ) – most of the change
in the impulse response functions between Sample 1 and Sample 2 is explained by a change
in monetary policy from ∆MP
1 to ∆MP
2 .
The last column of Figure 2 displays impulse response functions to a positive supply
shock, i.e., an innovation in qt.47 Again, the change in parameters of the private sector play
46Note that because gt+1 is predetermined, as discussed in Section 3, an unexpected demand disturbance
at date t does not aﬀect output before date t +1 .
47Note that the exogenous shock in the aggregate supply equation is Et−1qt, so that an unexpected supply
27a smaller role than monetary policy in aﬀecting the impulse response functions. The inﬂation
responses suggest that the change in monetary policy is responsible for a smaller and less
persistent response of inﬂation in the second sample. However, while the monetary policy rule
of sample 1 results in a fairly stable response of output, policy in sample 2 stimulates output
considerably. In fact, by responding more aggressively to expected inﬂation, monetary policy
in sample 2 mitigates the deﬂationary eﬀects of a positive supply shock by lowering interest
rates more on impact, which stimulates output.48 Stimulating output in such circumstances
brings it closer to its natural rate, i.e., the equilibrium output that obtains with ﬂexible
prices as it is also positively aﬀected by a supply shock.
4.3 Volatility
Many recent papers have documented a “great moderation” in the volatility of U.S. eco-
nomic activity and inﬂation since the early 1980’s.49 In fact the standard deviations of both
detrended output and inﬂation fell by more than one third between the pre- and post-80
samples. As we just discussed, while monetary policy rule of the post-80 period contributes
to reducing the response of output and inﬂation to both monetary shocks and real demand
shocks, it appears to increase the output response to supply shocks. It is thus not clear a
priori, to what extent the reduction in volatility can be explained by changes in policy, in
parameters describing the private sector, and in the shock processes. To understand this,
we turn to a simulation of our model under alternative combinations of estimated monetary
policy, parameters of the private sector and exogenous shocks. Of course all results presented
below assume that the model is well speciﬁed. In the previous subsection, we required that
the model correctly characterizes not the response of the endogenous variables to innovations
disturbance at date t does not aﬀect inﬂation before date t +1 .
48Inverserly, in the face of an adverse supply shock, the post-80 monetary policy is more restrictive and
contributes to a greater slowdown than the pre-80 policy.
49See, e.g., McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Boivin and Giannoni (2002),
Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004), Stock and Watson (2002, 2003), Ramey and Vine (2003).
28in the particular shocks. Now, we assume in addition that the exogenous shock processes be
correctly speciﬁed.
In order to perform counterfactual model simulations, we need to estimate the stochastic
processes of the three disturbances {εt,g t,q t}. Combining again the identiﬁed VAR of Section
2 with the structural model, we can extract a time series for the vector of exogenous variables
xt ≡ [εt,g t+1,E tqt+1]
0 , all known at date t, along the lines of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997). First, we rewrite our structural VAR in companion form as
¯ Zt = B ¯ Zt−1 +¯ ut (10)
where ¯ Zt is a vector containing all the variables of the VAR and their lags, and ¯ ut is an
unforecastable vector. Second, using the structural equations (4) — (8), and the estimated
parameters, we can express the shocks as a function of past, present and expected future
values of output, inﬂation and the interest rate. It follows that the vector of exogenous
variables xt can be expressed as a function of present and expected future values of a vector
˜ Zt which contains the theoretical variables corresponding to those in ¯ Zt. Third, assuming
that expectations of future variables in the model correspond to the VAR forecasts, so that
Et ˜ Zt+j = Et ¯ Zt+j = Bj ¯ Zt for all j>0,50 we can express xt as
xt = C ¯ Zt−1 + D¯ ut (11)
for some matrices C and D. This can then be used to generate a historical time series for xt.
The stochastic process for the exogenous (structural) disturbances is then characterized by
(10) — (11), together with a stochastic process for the VAR residuals ¯ ut a n da ni n i t i a lv a l u e
for ¯ Z.51
50It is important that both vectors ¯ Zt and ˜ Zt contain all relevant variables which are part of the information
s e ta td a t et (such as ˆ Yt+1 and πt+1), for the previous equality to hold.
51Using (10) — (11) together with the structural equations of the model, the historical VAR residuals ¯ ut,
and the appropriate initial value for ¯ Z reproduces exactly the historical time series of all variables.
29Table 4 contains the results of the counterfactual simulations for alternative policy rules
and structural parameters and shock processes. It reports standard deviations of output,
inﬂation, the interest rate, and the welfare-relevant output gap Et−2
³
ˆ Yt − ˆ Y n
t
´
, where ˆ Y n
t
is the ﬂexible-price level of output implied by the model. The upper part of the table
reports counterfactual standard deviations for alternative combinations of the monetary
policy parameters and the private sector parameters, using the shock processes for gt and qt
estimated in Sample 1. The lower part of Table 4 reports the results of the same calculations,
in the case that the shock processes are the ones estimated in Sample 2. The standard
deviations reported refer asymptotic statistics so that they are not aﬀected by the value of
the initial vector ¯ Z, but sample standard deviations yield similar qualitative results.
How important is the change of shock processes in explaining the “great moderation,”
i.e., the drop in observed output and inﬂation volatility in the post-80 period? Consistent
with, e.g., Stock and Watson (2003), our experiments show that if the monetary policy of
sample 2 had always been adopted, a change from shocks of period 1 to shocks of period 2
would have somewhat lowered the standard deviation of output and inﬂa t i o n( s e er o w s3 - 4
and 7-8 of Table 4). An entirely diﬀerent picture emerges however if the monetary policy of
sample 1 is maintained throughout. In fact, Table 4 suggests that the volatility of output
and inﬂation increase s u b s t a n t i a l l ya sw em o v et ot h es h o c k so fs a m p l e2( s e er o w s1 - 2a n d
5-6). This suggests that the “great moderation” cannot be explained solely, or even primarily
with a change in exogenous shocks. In our setup, it is not only the size of shocks that has
changed but also their mix. While the standard deviation of supply shocks falls from sample
1 to sample 2, the volatility of estimated real demand shocks increases.
Is the monetary policy then mainly responsible for the “great moderation”?I ft h es h o c k
processes of the pre-80 sample had continued to prevail in the post-80 period, then the shift
from pre-80 (∆MP
1 ) to post-80 (∆MP
2 ) policy would not have aﬀected the volatility of output
much (see rows 1 and 3, or 2 and 4 of Table 4). With the shocks of sample 2, however, we
30see that this shift in policy can indeed explain a large drop in output volatility (see rows 6
and 8).52
The story that emerges is thus not an all-shocks or an all-policy one, but a more subtle
one. In order to explain the decline in inﬂation and output volatility, it is crucial for the policy
rule to have changed the way it has, along with the shocks. To understand this, remember
from the previous subsection that the post-80 policy rule is particularly well suited to reduce
output and inﬂation volatility in the face of demand shocks, but that it exacerbates output
ﬂuctuations due to supply shocks. Such a policy appears thus to have mitigated the eﬀects
of more important demand shocks in the post-80 sample. At the same time, output volatility
has remained contained given relatively smaller supply shocks.
One may wonder next whether, for given shocks, the change in volatility is mostly due
to the policy rule or to a change in structural parameters of the private sector. If the latter
parameters had always been equal to those of the post-80 period (∆PS
2 ), a change in the
monetary policy rule from ∆MP
1 to ∆MP
2 would have lowered the volatility of inﬂation, the
output gap and the interest rate, regardless of the shock process. The post-80 policy rule
increases slightly the volatility of output in the case of the shocks estimated for the sample
1, but lowers it importantly in the case of the shocks of estimated for the sample 2. Again
this is due to the fact that supply shocks are relatively important in the ﬁrst sample, while
real demand shocks appear more important in the second sample.
Overall, these experiments suggest that the change in monetary policy has been instru-
52Stock and Watson (2003) perform a similar counterfactual experiment with several models, including
the estimated model of Smets and Wouters (2004), which is related to the one considered here. By letting
the monetary policy change from one that is supposed to characterize pre-80 policy to the one estimated
for the post-80 period, they ﬁnd that monetary policy does not account for much of the drop in output
volatility. To reconcile their results with ours, it is important to note that the structural parameters and
the shock processes that Stock and Watson use are based on the Smets and Wouters model estimated over
the entire 1957-2002 sample. Consequently, they don’t evaluate the importance of changes in the structural
shock processes in the context of that model. Instead, our counterfactual experiments are done separately
for both subsamples. Our results are consistent with those of Stock and Watson (2003) if we assume that the
shock processes are those of the pre-80 period, but not when they are those of the post-80 period. Moreover,
the pre-80 policy rule that they consider is constrained to yield a determinate equilibrium, which might
underestimate the role of the changes in monetary policy.
31mental in reducing the economy’s variability in the post-80 period. Note however that we
are relatively conservative in terms of the importance that we attribute to the monetary
policy rule. In fact, the estimation approach we adopted does not impose that the monetary
policy shocks estimated by (10) — (11) be orthogonal to the other shocks. One might argue
that the monetary policy shocks εt include systematic responses to other shocks. In the
exercise above, we attribute all of these systematic responses to “shocks” and not to policy.
By attributing instead these responses to policy, we ﬁnd an even more important role for the
policy rule in reducing the volatility of output and inﬂation.53 Once the residual monetary
policy shocks are set equal to zero in the counterfactual experiments, the importance of the
monetary policy rules in reducing volatility of output and inﬂation, becomes once again more
important.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Empirical evidence from VAR analyses, including the one presented here, suggests that
unexpected exogenous changes in the Fed funds rate have been followed by a smaller response
of output and inﬂation since the beginning of the 1980’s. In this paper, we have attempted
to determine the causes of this phenomenon and the implications for the eﬀectiveness of
monetary policy. In addition, we have investigated to what extent the great reduction in
output and inﬂation volatility can be explained by an alteration of shock processes, a change
in the behavior the private sector, or a shift in monetary policy.
53Speciﬁcally, we regress the monetary policy shock εt on the remaining shocks
εt = φggt+1 + φqEtqt+1 + νt (12)
to estimate a new monetary policy shock, νt, that is by construction orthogonal to innovations in other real
shocks. (Expanding this regression by including lags of gt+1 and Etqt+1 does not change any of our results.)
We then use the alternative vector of shocks ˆ xt =[ νt,g t+1,E tqt+1]
0 and the appropriately modifed expression
(11) to simulate our model. By combining the monetary policy rule (8) with (12), we eﬀectively allow the
interest rate to respond systematically to the real demand and supply shocks. Note that impulse responses
to νt are the same as the impulse responses to εt reported in Figures 1 and 2.
32We have focused on three dimensions of monetary policy eﬀectiveness: 1) its success in
eliminating non-fundamental sources of ﬂuctuations; 2) its ability to stabilize the eﬀects of
shocks on the economy, and 3) the extent to which it manages to reduce the amount of
randomness in the setting of its policy. Overall, we ﬁnd that the dominant cause behind the
alteration of the monetary transmission mechanism is a change in the conduct of monetary
policy, characterized mainly by a stronger response to inﬂation expectations output since the
early 1980’s. The post-80 monetary policy rules prevents potential non-fundamental forces
from aﬀecting the economy. Moreover, our counterfactual experiments suggest that the
policy response to monetary policy shocks and demand shocks has more eﬀectively mitigated
the eﬀects on output and inﬂation since the early 1980’s. In the face of supply shocks,
though, we ﬁnd that the post-80 policy reduces inﬂation ﬂuctuations but exacerbates output
ﬂuctuations, so as to bring output closer to its natural rate. Changes in the variance of
policy shocks have only played a negligible role. Taken together, we view these results as
suggesting that monetary has become more eﬀective at stabilizing the economy.
Counterfactual experiments reported here suggest that the change in monetary policy has
also been instrumental in reducing observed output and inﬂation volatility in the post-80
period. Consistent with other studies, the change in shocks has also played an important role.
However while the size of the shocks has changed, their mix has also changed importantly.
We ﬁnd that a change in shocks only would not have reduced the volatility. Neither would
a change in policy only have done it. The explanation found here is a more subtle one in
w h i c hi no r d e rt oe x p l a i nt h ed e c l i n ei ni n ﬂation and output volatility, it is crucial for the
policy rule to have changed the way it has, along with the shocks.
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41A R o b u s t n e s sa n a l y s i so fV A Rr e s u l t s
In this Appendix we investigate the robustness of the VAR ﬁn d i n g sr e p o r t e di nS e c t i o n2 ,
to the inclusion of more information in the VAR and to the choice of an alternative starting
date for the second sample, namely 1984:1.
The speciﬁcation used in this paper was favored on the ground that it contained the
minimum set of variables necessary for our investigation, while delivering sensible responses
of the economy consistent with existing results. As is commonly done in this literature,
the commodity price index was included to alleviate the so-called price puzzle. Yet, our
VAR does contain a limited amount information and this potential misspeciﬁcation could
contaminate our empirical results. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and Bernanke, Boivin and
Eliasz (2005) propose a way of incorporating more information in low dimensional VARs.
More speciﬁcally, building on recent development on the estimation dynamic factor models
with large panels,54 their strategy is to expand VAR systems with a few factors estimated
from a large panel of macroeconomic series. We follow the exact same factor-augmented VAR
(FAVAR) strategy here, expanding a VAR in {ˆ Yt,πt,R t} with the ﬁrst factor estimated from
the panel of macroeconomic series used in Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005).55 Note that
if this factor properly accounts for the existing information, there is no justiﬁcation to have
the commodity price index in the VAR, which we thus exclude.56 It is important to note
that if the baseline VAR is properly speciﬁed, the inclusion of additional information should
not aﬀect the results.
We estimate the impulse response functions for the FAVAR model for the two samples
considered in the text, as well as a third one corresponding to the alternative break date, that
is the post-84:1 period. The results are reported in Figure 3 together with those obtained
54See Stock and Watson (2002), Forni, Lippi and Reichlin (2000) among others.
55See Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) for details on the implementation, the data set and the identiﬁ-
cation strategy — consistent with our VAR — in this framework.
56In fact, adding the commodity price index on top of the factor does not aﬀect the result. These results
are not reported.
42from the VAR speciﬁcation used in the paper. The conﬁdence intervals displayed are those
obtained from the baseline VAR.
Looking ﬁr s ta tt h er e s u l t sf o rt h eb a s e l i n eV A Rm o d e l– the -+- line in the ﬁgure –
we observe that the reduced eﬀect of a monetary policy shock in the post-80 period is robust
to the alternative break date considered. But, there are still notable diﬀerences between
the post-80 and post-84 samples. In particular, the response of inﬂation appears somewhat
stronger when the VAR is estimated on the latter, and the response of output is positive for
most of the periods in the ﬁrst two years following a positive innovation to the Fed funds rate.
We feel that this latter feature of the post-84 impulse response functions is problematic. In
fact, it implies that over the ﬁrst two years, a tightening of monetary policy results mainly
in an expansionary eﬀect on the economy, which is inconsistent with the implications of any
standard macroeconomic model. This might suggest misspeciﬁcation of our baseline VAR
for the post-84, but given the much larger conﬁdence interval, this could also be due to the
imprecision of the estimation on this shorter sample.
Turning now to the results obtained from the FAVAR model, two key conclusions emerge.
First, for the pre- and post-80 periods — the ﬁrst two columns in the ﬁgure — the results are
essentially the same as those obtained with the baseline speciﬁcation. There is a somewhat
stronger response of output in the pre-80 period that goes outside the conﬁdence intervals
of the baseline VAR; but this would reinforce our ﬁnding that there has been an important
reduction in the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks on output. The second conclusion is that
the results of the baseline VAR for the post-84 period are not robust to the inclusion of the
additional information. More strikingly, the inclusion of the factor has the eﬀect of reversing
the sign of the response of output, thus becoming consistent with conventional wisdom and
with the results from the other samples. This suggests that more information was used in
t h ec o n d u c to fm o n e t a r yp o l i c yi nt h ep o s t - 8 4p e r i o d ,w h i c hn e e d st ob ea c c o u n t e df o ri n
order to properly identify the impulse response functions.
43Overall, this robustness analysis suggests that the pre- and post-80 comparison under-
t a k e ni nt h ep a p e ri sj u s t i ﬁed, as the inclusion of more information does not aﬀect the
VAR conclusions for these two samples and makes the conclusions obtained from the post-84
period broadly consistent with those of the post-80 period.
B Details on the structural model
As indicated in section 3.1, each household seeks to maximizes its utility (3). Following Dixit















with a constant elasticity of substitution between goods, θ>1. It follows that optimal






pt (z) is the price of good z at date t,a n dPt is the corresponding Dixit-Stiglitz price in-
dex. Since ﬁnancial markets are assumed to be complete, all households face an identical
intertemporal budget constraint, and choose to consume the same amount at any date. We
may therefore drop the superscript j in C
j
t. Furthermore, we assume as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) that households must choose the index Ct at date t − 2. The household’s
optimal choice of expenditure satisﬁes
Et−2 {ΛtPt} = Et−2
©
uc (Ct − ˜ ηCt−1;ξt) − β˜ ηuc
¡
Ct+1 − ˜ ηCt;ξt+1
¢ª
, (14)
where Λt represents the household’s marginal utility of additional nominal income at date t.
This equation indicates that at date t − 2, the household chooses a level of expenditure Ct
for period t that equates the expected utility of additional expenditure with the expected
marginal utility of additional nominal income. While the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of (14) represents the expected eﬀect of a change in expenditure at date t on instantaneous
44utility at that date, the second term represents the eﬀect of a change in Ct on instantaneous
utility in the following period, through its eﬀect on the stock of habit. The marginal utilities
of income furthermore satisfy
Λt = β (1 + Rt)EtΛt+1, (15)
where Rt is the rate of return on a riskless nominal one-period asset. In addition, we assume
that the government purchases an aggregate Gt of all goods in the economy of the form (13).







where the aggregate demand for the composite good, Yt, satisﬁes Yt = Ct + Gt.
We consider ﬁrst-order approximations of (14), (15) and the goods market equilibrium












2¢ ˆ Ct − ˜ η ˆ Ct−1 − β˜ η ˆ Ct+1 − ¯ Ct + β˜ η ¯ Ct+1
i
, (17)
ˆ λt = Et
³




¡ ¯ C/¯ Y
¢ ˆ Ct + ˆ Gt (19)
where ˆ λt, ˆ Ct, ˆ Yt,a n dˆ Rt represent respectively percent deviations of (ΛtPt),C t,Y t, and
1+Rt from their steady-state level, ˆ Gt ≡
¡
Gt − ¯ G
¢
/¯ Y,π t ≡ log(Pt/Pt−1), and ¯ Ct ≡ σc
ucξ
uc ξt
represents exogenous shifts in marginal utility of consumption, and σc ≡− uc/(ucc ¯ C) > 0.
Interating (18) forward, we obtain ˆ λt =ˆ rL
t where ˆ rL
t is deﬁn e di n( 5 )i nt h et e x t .C o m b i n i n g
this with (17) and (19) to eliminate ˆ Ct, and recalling that Et−2 ˆ Ct = ˆ Ct, we get (4).
To obtain the aggregate supply equation (6), we note that since every supplier faces the
same demand function given by (16), all suppliers allowed to change their price in period t




















































While the ﬁrst term inside the brackets represents the contribution to expected utility from
sales revenues at date T, given that the seller chooses a price p∗
t, the second term represents
disutility resulting from the supply of goods demanded at date T. The household discounts
the stream of utilities by a factor αβ t oa c c o u n tf o rt h ef a c tt h a tt h ep r i c ec h o s e na td a t e
t will apply in period T with probability αT−t. Log-linearizing the ﬁrst-order condition to

















− (πt − γπt−1)
)
, (20)
where ω ≡ vyy¯ Y/ v y > 0, ˆ st ≡ ωˆ Yt − ˆ λt − qt represents percent deviations from steady-state
of the average (across ﬁrms) real marginal cost, and qt ≡−
vyξ
vy ξt. It can be shown that ˆ st
relates to a measure of the output gap deﬁned as the percent deviation of output from its
natural rate whereby the natural rate we mean the equilibrium output that would obtain in
the absence of price rigidities.57 Quasi-diﬀerentiating (20) yields the optimal pricing decision
ˆ p
∗





Et−1ˆ st + αβEt−1 (πt+1 − γπt). (21)
Assuming furthermore that the price-setters who are allowed to change their price are chosen
57This is most easily seen in the absence of habit persistence, η =0 . Using (17) and (19) in this case to






ˆ Yt − ˆ Y n
t
´
where σ = σc
¡ ¯ C/¯ Y
¢
, and ˆ Y n
t =
¡









indicates percent deviations from
steady state of the natural rate of output. In the presence of habit formation, however, the real marginal
cost relates to expected output gaps at current, future and past periods (see Giannoni and Woodford, 2004).









Log-linearizing this law of motion for Pt, and combining the resulting expression with (21)
yields (6).




0 0.001 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.003
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.012 0.029 0.021 0.023 0.027
3 0.053 0.015 0.003 0.005 0.003
4 0.011 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.000
1979:3—2002:2
0 0.009 0.017 0.022 0.024 0.030
1 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.005
2 0.307 0.278 0.250 0.307 0.258
3 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.009
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The table reports for each forecasting horizon combination (hπ,h y),t h ep−value of the
Hansen J-test. A p−value smaller than 0.05 signiﬁes that the model speciﬁcation is rejected at the
5 percent level. See text for details.
48Table 2: Estimates of structural parameters





















Note: Results based on the minimum distance estimation described in the text. Standard errors
are in parentheses. (–) denotes that the standard error is not available because the parameter is
hitting the boundary of the parameter space.








Note: This table reports whether the structural model results in a determinate (D) equilibrium











, in samples s =1 ,2.
49Table 4: Standard deviations of output, inﬂation, interest rate and the output
gap in counterfactual experiments
Sample 1 shock process (pre-1980)









































2.90 1.32 1.82 11.30










































1.71 0.93 1.78 8.02
Note: The table reports counterfactual asymptotic standard deviations for alternative combinations
of the shock processes, monetary policy coeﬃcients and the private sector parameters. All numbers
are expressed in percent. Standard deviations for inﬂation and the interest rate are annualized.
50Figure 1. VAR and Model-Based Impulse Responses to a Same-Size Monetary Shock
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